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Abstract
This dissertation attempts to estimate the impact of Information and Communication Technologies invest-
ment (ICT) on price setting at the sectoral level. The paper therefore ﬁlls a gap in the literature on the  new
economy , which has so far focused mainly on the eﬀect of ICT on productivity and wages. We deﬁne two
possible channels: a  direct  one stemming from the decreasing cost of ICT capital, and an  indirect  coming
from the productivity gains that ICT provides.
We run regressions using panel data on the evolution of prices for 24 industries in two countries: the US and
the Netherlands. We estimate the direct eﬀect by including the evolution of total costs then splitting it into
prices and volumes growth rates of each factor including ICT capital. The indirect eﬀect, on the other hand, is
captured using several 5 years moving averages indicators of ICT investment and complementary investments
that accompany it.
We provide, what we believe, to be fairly reliable estimations of the price eﬀect, and ﬁnd suggestive evidence
for the productivity channel.
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1 Introduction
In a speech to the federal board in 1996, Alan Greenspan famously described the emergence of information and
communication technologies as a  once or twice in a century, at most  event. Many analysts shared Greenspan`s
interest in the extent of ICT`s impact on the economy, particularly with respect to productivity and wages. It seems
that a consensus has emerged regarding productivity gains from ICT, which started to be felt in the second part of
the 90's for some countries; however there is only suggestive evidence that ICT may have impacted wages, notably
that of skilled workers.
One area that has been surprisingly left out by researchers is ICT's eﬀect on prices, although virtually all
researchers seem to take it for granted that ICT has had a strong deﬂationary eﬀect. This belief is also likely to
have motivated Greenspan's stance on monetary policy between 1995 and 2001, a period throughout which he kept
interest rates low despite a booming economy; which implies that he considered that potential output was rising
with current output. This dissertation, thus, intends to take one step towards the formalization and testing of the
strength of this productivity eﬀect of ICT on inﬂation. The paper also accounts for another channel between ICT
and producers' prices, which stems from the obvious decrease in the prices of ICT goods and services, which should
have impacted the ﬁrms' costs.
The paper is organized as follows: section 1 reviews the literature on productivity and wages in order to assess
whether it is likely that ICT has had a depressing impact on labour costs. Section 2 starts with an in-depth dicussion
of the two eﬀects mentioned, before including them into a theoretical model. Section 3 presents our dataset, the
variables used or created, and a discussion of some of the methodological problems faced. Section 4 will present
our results focusing mainly on the performance of our  productivity  eﬀect. Finally Section 5 provides additional
robustness checks, further analysis of our  price  eﬀect, and a discussion of the limitations of our estimations.
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2 ICT,PRODUCTIVITY ANDWAGES: A REVIEWOF LITERATURE
2.1 ICT and productivity
2.1.1 A global outlook
Robert Solow's famous observation that  you can see the computer age everywhere but in the productivity statis-
tics  (1987) could somewhat simplistically be seen as the starting point of the accumulation of vast literature on
the impact of ICT on the economy. The  Solow paradox  remained untill the start of the new millenium where
new evidence emerged, pointing at a positive relationship between ICT spending and growth in the U.S. (Stiroh,
2002; Jorgenson, 2003). Numerous subsequent studies identiﬁed the shift in the trend of productivity around the
mid-90's. Most of these studies used a growth accounting approach in which the growth of output is equated to the
growth of each input weighted by its income share, plus a residual term serving which is typically interpreted as
a proxy for total factor productivity (TFP). These macroeconomic studies came as a conﬁrmation of anterior ﬁrm
level studies which had already highlighted the link between ICT and productivity1.
However this may not be as clear-cut. Gordon (2000, 2002) argues that the rise in productivity of the 90's
was above all a cyclical phenomenon reﬂecting a favorable macroeconomic environment. On methological grounds,
growth accounting is based on several implicit assumptions about the production functions such as the fact that
technological change is hicks neutral, or constant returns to scale (Crafts and O'Mahon, 2001). Stiroh (2001) adds
that that  the use of factor shares to proxy for output elasticities essentially assumes the results about the impact
of capital  and that growth accounting disregards the large sectoral heterogeneity in production functions in a
given country.
Extending the analysis to the rest of the world we ﬁnd very diﬀerent patterns, as shown in ﬁgure 1. Indeed, as
pointed out by the OECD (2003), a signiﬁcant relationship between ICT and productivity is found with  reasonable
conﬁdence  outside the US namely in Canada, New Zealand, Australia, the Nordic countries and the Netherlands
excluding big ICT spenders such as the UK or Germany.
Analysts have particularly focused on the diﬀerence in impacts between the US and the EU. For instance, Bart
Van ark or Luc Soete (2010) argued that the slower rate of ICT adoption and diﬀusion in the EU was a key element
to the large diﬀerences in productivity growth observed in the last 15 years between both regions. Figure 2 provides
1see D. Pilat (2004) for a review of the literature on ﬁrm-level studies
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Figure 1: ICT's Contribution to Economic Growth
source: ITU adapted from Jorgenson and Vu (2005)
Figure 2: Wholesale and retail trade and ﬁnancial intermediation explain most of the gap
Source: Groningnen Growth and Development Centre, 60-Industry Database October 2005
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strong evidence in favor of this view by highlighting the preponderous part played by two very ICT-intensive sectors:
wholesale and retail trade, and ﬁnancial intermediation.
Europe has recently recognized its need to increase its competitiveness by becoming the most dynamic knowledge
economy in the world. The Barcelona objective, in which the EU member states raise their R&D intensity and
expenditures to 3% by the end of 2010 (Erasme 2006), was seen as the mean to achieve this. The above discussion
implies that another way to to close this gap between the regions would be through accrued investment in ICT,
and greater eﬀorts in diﬀusing it quickly.
2.1.2 How can ICT foster productivity?
Why such diﬀerences? The answer to this question requires a detailed analysis of the channels through which ICT
aﬀects productivity. Maggi, Meliciani and Cardoni (2007) summarize existing works by deﬁning three main channels
of ICT usage: direct ICT production, ICT as a capital input, and ICTs as a special capital input that  generate
spillovers or free beneﬁts that exceed the direct returns to ICT capital .
Some economists put great emphasis on this latter eﬀect and rank ICT as a general purpose technology (GPT);
that is a radical idea and/or technique that has far-reaching eﬀects on various industries in an economy. Bresnahan
and Rotenberg (1995) deﬁne three main characteristics for a GPT: ﬁrstly, they are pervasive in that they are able
to be widely used as inputs in many downstream industries. Secondly, they are technologically dynamic, that is,
they are able to be further improved on. Finally, they are innovation complements as they are able to increase the
productivity of R&D in downstream industries.
To diﬀerentiate ICT production from ICT as an input, most studies separate their analysis between the ICT
producting sector and the ICT-using one, for instance Bart van Ark, Robert Inklaar and Robert McGuckin (2002)
estimate labor productivity growth for each. Their ﬁndings are summarized in table 1.
Although the ICT- producing sector has experienced very high labour productivity growth, diﬀerences in total
productivity growths between the US and the EU stem primarily from the much larger ICT-using sector. This
includes notably a large amount of services, since ICT is a complement to labor factor which they use intensively.
In other words ICT seems more powerful as an input than as an end product.
However the evidence from such an  industry  approach on whether this is the result of  regular  capital
deepening or spillovers is more scarce, as  diﬀerentiating between these forces [..] is quite diﬃcult and subject to
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Table 1: Productivity growth and GDP shares of ICT producing, using and non-ICT industries in EU and U.S
Source: van Ark, Inklaar and McGuckin (2002, 2003a)
potentially severe measurement problems (Stiroh 2001). The problem lies in the fact that to reap the full beneﬁts
of ICT as a GPT a ﬁrm must do more than buy new computers and softwares: it must, for example, reorganize its
splitting of tasks, or undertake internal research and development to further adapt the new software to its needs.
Such costs may be untangible and thus do not appear as inputs in a typical growth accounting framework.
To solve this problem some researchers like Bart van Ark and Charles Hulten (2005) have tried to proxy the
extent of these externalities, mostly by trying to evaluate the  immesurable investments  that accompany ICT
investments. The addition of unobservables usually has the expected eﬀect of transferring some of the measured
residual TFP to the labor factor (e.g Oliner,Sichel, Stiroh, 2007). However this approach is, by deﬁnition, subject to
large measurement errors. Overall, athough there are suggestive macro econometric ﬁndings (for example Basu and
Fernald claimed in 2006 that the fact that TFP rose in ICT-using sectors during the 90's is indirect evidence) the
main support in favor of ICT as a GPT comes from microeconomic evidence which shows unambiguously that ﬁrms
who spend more in complementary investments and organizational changes experience higher growth in productivity
(Black and Lynch, 2001).
The impact of ICT as an input therefore appears to be a mix of all three factors considered above. In this context
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the observed diﬀerence in productivity growths between the US and Europe reﬂects the twice higher investment per
unit of output in US, but also as pointed out by the OECD (2003)  costs and implementation barriers are related
to enabling factors, e.g. linked to the availability of know-how or qualiﬁed personnel, or the scope for organisational
change .
2.2 ICT and wages
2.2.1 The wage premium between 1980 and 2000
From a neoclassical perspective we would expect wages to increase with productivity. Preliminary analysis tells us
that over the period in which productivity gains were felt the most part (1995-2000), wages did take oﬀ . However
this correlation could be due to many other factors, such as a positive business cycle. A more appropriate way to
measure the eﬀect of ICT on wages would be to study the wage diﬀerential between skilled and unskilled workers,
or more generally wage inequality. Indeed most analysts agree that ICT may be seen as a skill-biased technical
change (SBTC from here on), a view inspired from the importance of qualiﬁed personel to reap the beneﬁts from
ICT as highlighted in the previous section. Therefore we now discuss whether inequality has been rising in the US,
the country that showed the greatest increase in productivity.
Early studies in the nineties seemed to conﬁrm the role of ICT on the evolution of inequality. Katz and Murphy
(1991) show that, despite a solid growth in the number of college graduates, the return to education increased
during the 80's, reﬂecting a dramatic expansion in the demand for skilled labour2. Berman, Bound and Griliches
(1994) ﬁrst relate this trend to technological change emanating both from R&D and computer use. They ﬁnd using
survey, data, that both are signiﬁcant contributors to the increase in the share of nonproduction workers in total
cost, with a growing eﬀect for the latter.
However in the nineties researchers found mixed results. As shown by ﬁgure 3, inequality as measured by the
ratio of earnings of top decile over the bottom one stabilized. This slowdown was due mainly to a steadying or
even contracting inequality between median and low earners while that between median and high earners has been
rising. Thus economists agree there has been a polarization of earnings: Antonczyk, DeLeire, Fitzenberger (2010),
for instance, document an increase in both demand for labour and wages for the top and bottom 20% of the wage
distribution.
2other work on the subject include Bound and Johnson 1992; Levy and Murnane 1992; or Johnson 1997
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Figure 3: aggregate wage inequality
Source: Card and DiNardo (2002)
2.2.2 Discussing the real contribution of skill biased technical change
As pointed out by Card and Dinardo,  stability of aggregate wage inequality over the 1990s presents a potentially
important puzzle for the SBTC hypothesis, since there were continuing advances in computer-related technology
throughout the decade that were arguably as skill biased as the innovations in the early 1980s . The SBTC also
fails to explain the growing within group  inequality which represents 55% of growth in inequality between 1973
and 1995 in the US according to Mishel and Bernstein (2003)3.
Alternative explanations seem to do better in explaining these trends in wage inequality. Krugman (2008)
puts forward the role of trade: during the 90's US imports turned to less labour-intensive goods through vertical
specialization, relieving some of the downward pressure on low-skilled wages. Other authors have focused on the
eﬀect of institutional factors such as deunionisation, or most importantly the minimun wage, which has sharply
decreased during the 80's. Lee's study of 1999 provides strong support in favor of this hypothesis: the introduction
of minimum wage in his basic regression dramatically rises its explanative power, particularly with respect to
within-group inequality, and brings all coeﬃcients close to 0.
However technological change may still be partly explanatory. Indeed, Autor, Levy, and Murnane (2003) oﬀer
3see Lemieux 2006b for a discussion of within inequality
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a ﬁner version of the SBTC in which the impact of ICT depends more on the tasks performed by workers than
their skill level. In this context, during the 80's a high premium for the most qualiﬁed workers arose from the
complementarity of ICT with more abstract work; while in the 90's its diﬀusion led to an accrued substitution of
 routine tasks , usually performed by mid-skilled workers, while the demand for  manual tasks  performed by
low-skilled workers remained unaltered. Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2008) discuss how this task theory compares
with the minimum wage explanation, and ﬁnd suggestive evidence that the latter has played a part. Similarly
Michaels Natraj Van Reenen (2010) ﬁnd that technology remains robust to the inclusion of trade openess on
relative wages.
Additional support comes from micro level studies which have consistently found evidence of a strong ICT
premium on individual wages. For instance, Goss and Phillips (2002) ﬁnd that the use of the internet increases
wages by over 13.5% ceteris paribus. However as noted by Goss and Phillips, it is hard to know  whether the wage
premium paid to computer workers was due to more productive workers selecting jobs requiring computer usage
or to the productivity enhancing power of the computer . Thus one should be cautious of endogeneity, despite
signiﬁcant attempts to control for it by certain authors4.
2.2.3 Users and producers
While the previous section suggests that the SBTC has had a limited eﬀect on wage inequality, this may hide
signiﬁcant variations across sectors or individuals. Van ark et al. again dissociate the direct eﬀects of ICT production
from its diﬀusion on labour demand. Their ﬁndings are summarized in table 2.
As expected, IT producing sectors have experienced an above-average growth in overall wages, driven by the
late half of the 90's. However the demand for labour from IT producers shrunk following the burst of the dot-com
bubble in 2001. Hotchkiss et al. estimate this fall to be 16.9% (2005), but they also ﬁnd that earnings still remained
higher in IT. Furthermore, high-skilled workers who transitioned out of IT production saw their wages decrease but
remain above the average of the industry they had joined. In a follow-up paper (2005) the same authors explain
this diﬀerence by a higher premium and a higher share of directly IT-related tasks for IT producers.
For ICT-users, the productivity gains have clearly failed to translate into higher wages on aggregate, but looking
in more details yields interesting insights. Van Ark et al. argue that users in services cope better than manufacturers
4See Goss and Phillips, 2002, or Entorf and Kramarz (1997) for a discussion of the selectivity bias and strategies to solve it
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Table 2: Employment growth and GDP shares of ICT producing, using and non-ICT industries in the EU and the
U.S
Source: Van Ark et al. (2003)
because the gains of productivity are more labour-saving in the latter. Bresnahan et al ( 2002) relate labour demand
to the complementary investments needed to reap all beneﬁts from ICT, and ﬁnd, using ﬁrm level data, that these
investments are in fact more important in explaining labour demand for skilled workers than technical change itself.
Finally Chun (2003) separates adoption and use of ICT by introducing ICT spending and the age of ICT capital in
a regression on wages. He ﬁnds that both had a signiﬁcant impact on relative demand of labour.
To sum up, our review of literature indicates that ICT may have been a contributing factor to the evolution of
the skilled workers' wage premium. However considering the diﬀerence in trends between the 80's and 90's, and
the good performance of competing explanations in the data; this contribution is not likely to be large. Across
industries the aggregate performance of wages of ICT-using industries is particularly disappointing when compared
to its productivity growth, despite some suggestive evidence from certain particular industries.
Crucially what we take away from this discussion is that labour productivity has been on the rise during the
nineties, particularly in the second half. This increase should, in theory, have impacted more the productivity of
skilled workers, but so far it seems that it has failed to signiﬁcantly translate into higher wages for them. This
diﬀerence between the marginal product of a factor and its reward is what drives this dissertation.
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3 ICT AND INFLATION
3.1 Diﬀerent channels
3.1.1 Technological change eﬀect
Since a signiﬁcant impact of ICT is hard to ﬁnd on high-skilled labour, it seems safe to make this more modest claim:
the evolution of overall wage level has not followed that of overall productivity. From a neo-classical point of view,
this disconnection implies a departure from the economy's steady state in which each factor of production is paid his
marginal product. Economists usually explain this by wage stickiness, which itself stems from workers' imperfect
information or bounded rationality, and frictions on the labour market. If wages grow less than productivity, we
should observe, ceteris paribus, a decrease in the ﬁrm's costs translating into lower prices.
A way to study this diﬀerence is to compare the observed rate of unemployment and the non accelerating
inﬂation rate of unemployment (NAIRU). The NAIRU is the threshold above which an increase in the demand for
labour leads to inﬂationary pressures. When productivity increases, this threshold should decrease as the rise in
wages resulting from an increase in labour demand merely reﬂects a catch-up towards the  real  value of labour.
Ball and Mankiw (2002) ﬁnd strong evidence of this relationship, as shown in the ﬁgure 4.
Figure 4:NAIRU and productivity growth
Source: Ball and Mankiw, 2002
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Figure 4:
Figure 5:
When unemployment fully adjusts back to NAIRU, the postive eﬀect of technological change on prices dies out.
Inﬂation is thus eventually a monetary phenomenon, as suggested by Friedman (1970). However in practice this
adjustment occurs after a long lag. This leads to sustained low inﬂation and high growth, as in the second part of
the 90's. Therefore ICT may, in theory, have eased inﬂationary pressures through its eﬀect on productivity.
3.1.2 ICT as a regular input
Following the approach of many studies on ICT and productivity, one can distinguish the eﬀect of ICT as a special
input from that of pure factor accumulation for prices. This latter eﬀect is expected to be particularly strong as ICT
inputs' prices have been spectacularly decreasing since 1980, and their share in total factor use increasing. Tables 5,
extracted from our data set,conﬁrm this intuition by comparing the two main ICT-producing sectors to the average
industry in terms of prices and output growth for the US.
Figure 5 :ICT producing industries' volume and price evolution compared to other industries'
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In the  electrical equipment  sector, this evolution was mainly driven by the falling price of computers, which
has been clear to all users. Not only are computers cheaper, but their quality has also been increasing. Note that
Figure 5 does adjust for this through the method of hedonic prices. Using this method the US bureau of statistics
has estimated that prices of computers and peripheral equipement have decreased by a stunning 25 to 30% annually
between 1995 and 1999. Therefore ICT producing sectors may well generate sectoral disinﬂation : a shock in
particular sectors generates costs reductions which then diﬀuse throughout the economy.
3.1.3 ICT speciﬁc eﬀects
The few authors who have been interested in ICT and prices have usually focused on diﬀerent channels than this
productivity one.
One branch focuses more on cost reducing externalities. In particular, ICT, and more precisely internet, should
decrease the search costs both for transations among producers, and between producers. Brookes and Wahhaj
(2001) investigate the eﬀect of the latter using a general equilibrium model and ﬁnd that the decline in the cost of
information to producers could allow Europe and Japan to increase their growth by 0.25 point without inﬂationary
pressures. Wadhwani (2000) adds that the shortening of supply chain and a better job seekers /vacancies matching
on the labour market should help ﬁrms reduce their costs.
The  new economy  should also aﬀect markups. Wadhwani mentions the higher competitive pressures due to
more information being available to consumers; we could add direct competition from companies selling directly on
the internet such as of amazon.com. However Kneller and Young (2001) argue that this eﬀect has yet to be felt,
for instance in England, books  were 22 per cent cheaper on the internet than in the High Street. But book prices
generally were 3.0 per cent higher in April 2001 than they had been a year earlier, as compared to the 0.1 per cent
fall in the goods component of the RPI over the same period. Another side eﬀect of ICT is that barriers to entry
to a given market may be lower.
Meijers (2006) provides a theoretical model in which cost and markup eﬀects interact each other:  ﬁrst movers 
towards ICT lower their costs but increase their margin as they earn a temporary monopoly. As more ﬁrms move
towards ICT this power shrinks and so does the markup. Therefore prices fall continuously untill ICT has fully
diﬀused. Unfortunately, he does not test this.
Although we have seen that pressures on wages were quite low following the ICT boom, a ﬁnal theoretical
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possibility is that ICT related technological progress actually pushes inﬂation up by generating a strong wealth
eﬀect5. This wealth eﬀect could come through either actual or anticipated higher wages, or positive balance sheets
eﬀects. Inﬂation can also arise if a given sector experiences large productivity gains which leads to upward pressures
on wages and thus higher costs for other sectors whose productivity has not risen.
3.2 Model
In order to set up a model which captures most of the above eﬀects, we borrow the work of Romer (1986) and the
comments of Barro (1998) who relates endogenous growth theories to growth accounting. In Romer's model the
ﬁrm's production is deﬁned as:
Yi = AK
α
i K
βL1−αi (1)
Where 0 < α < 1 and β > 0; and Ki, Li are respectively the capital and labour input used by the ﬁrm i
(we present a model with only two factors for clarity purposes). Kb represents the economy's worldwide stock of
knowledge: when a given ﬁrm rises its own capital Ki, it rises K also. Thus production exhibits constant returns
to scale if β = 0, and increasing returns if β > 0.
The ﬁrm, however, does not account for this external eﬀect on K when deciding upon its optimal input combi-
nation ; it only considers private returns. Therefore all the derivations for optimal behavior take place in a constant
returns to scale framework. Assuming in addition that the ﬁrm behaves competitively, we have:
Yi = Ci = wLi + rKi (2)
And factor prices equal to each factor's private marginal product:
r = α
Yi
Ki
w = (1− α)Yi
Li
5see textbook  Foundations of International Macroeconomic  by Rogoﬀ and Obstfeld for a detailed model using tradable and
nontradable goods
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Factor-income shares are thus given by sk = αand sl = 1− α
This implies that, in equilibrium, the capital to labour ratios K/L should be equal amongst ﬁrms. After a little
algebra 6, we obtain the following equilibrium aggregate production function:
Y = AKα+βL1−α (3)
Diﬀerentiating this expression with respect to time we obtain:
4Y
Y
= α
4K
K
+ (1− α)4L
L
+
4A′
A′
(4)
Where 4A
′
A′ represents the evolution of production not explained by factor accumulation, and is deﬁned by:
4A′
A′
= β
4K
K
+
4A
A
(5)
We shall see that it is uncertain whether total factor productivity will be deﬁned by the term 4A
′
A′ or
4A
A .
Now let us apply this line of reasoning to our case. Ki now represents investment in ICT capital, and its price is
now PICT . The change we apply is marginal: instead of inserting the  external  eﬀect through an economy-wide
stock of knowledge Kβ ; we introduce it within a single ﬁrm K
′b
i . K
α
i and K
′b
i thus capture 2 diﬀerent impacts
of ICT on production, respectively the private return of ICT as an input like any other; and the impact of ICT
as a special input can shift the innovation possibility fronteer in the medium run, in a way that is not yet known
nor accounted for by the ﬁrm.This idea is nothing more than a reformulation of the literature led by Sherer on the
importance of ICT adoption, as opposed to simple use of ICT. The ﬁrm's production function is thus:
Yi = AK
α
i K
′b
i L
1−α
i
Diﬀerenciating we would get 4YiYi = α
4Ki
Ki
+ (1 − α)4LiLi +
4A′i
A′i
, where
4A′i
A′i
= β
4K′i
K′i
+ 4AA . However we are
interested in prices here, so that we set up a simple cost minimization problem and use a Lagrangian to obtain the
following cost function:
6see barro (1998) for step by step derivation
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Ci =
Yi
A′i
(
Pαictw
1−α
αα(1− α)α−1 ) (6)
Since we assume perfect competition this yields:
Pi = mci =
1
A′i
(
Pαictw
1−α
αα(1− α)α−1 ) (7)
Where mci is marginal cost. Log-diﬀerentiating again we obtain our relationship of interest:
4Pi
Pi
= (1− α)4w
w
+ α
4Pict
Pict︸ ︷︷ ︸
(a)
− 4A
A
− β4K
′
i
K ′i︸ ︷︷ ︸
(b)
(8)
Where (a) can be seen as representing the  direct input cost  eﬀect, and (b) our  productivity  eﬀect.
This model clearly contains many simplifying assumptions and its main goal is merely to convey the intuition:
in practice we will be more interested in the signs than the values of the coeﬃcients.
Let us note that the model above does not include a markup. The reason is that our estimations will not
include an indepth study of the eﬀect of ICT on markup as discussed in section 2 and 3. Indeed data on markups
is notoriously hard to ﬁnd ; and even if we did have such data or good proxies, isolating the eﬀect of ICT on it
would have been a daunting task, since the alleged pro-competitive eﬀect of ICT is not necessarily a function of
the industry's ICT spending. For example the book industry may not be a large ICT spender; but probably was
subject to a strong competition eﬀect from ICT diﬀusion. Kneller and Young agree that  at this stage there is no
obvious evidence of such an eﬀect of ICT on markups.
4 VARIABLES PRESENTATION AND DATA ASSESSMENT
In the model above feature the two explicit eﬀects that we are interested in: the impact on inﬂation of ICT as a
regular input whose price is falling ( or price eﬀect), and that of ICT as a special input (or productivity eﬀect).
The goal of this section is to deﬁne how we will capture these eﬀects in practice, and discuss the data used.
In deﬁning some of these variables we faced a certain amount of technical diﬃculties. In order not to lose sight
of the point of this study, we have decided to relegate the description of the way we tackled them to our appendix.
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We encourage the interested reader to refer to them. Appendix B focuses on productivity proxies, C on the price
eﬀect, while D is dedicated to our controls.
4.1 Preliminary description of the sample
We use industry-level data following the classiﬁcation SIC Rev3 for the US and the Netherlands, for years between
1980 and 2005. Our initial sample contains 32 industries, but only 24 for each country were eventually used in
regressions7. The rationale for including two countries was to increase our number of observations, which was a too
low in some speciﬁcations that contains only 24 sectors. The Netherlands and the US were chosen because previous
studies have established that ICT had an eﬀect on productivity for these countries, which is a necessary condition
in our story. We did not include more countries partly because the data on other countries which experienced
productivity gains seemed to be of lower quality, and partly due to time constraints. Therefore each observation
relates to a given industry in a given country. We only use ratios over value added and relative evolutions to ensure
that the sectors from both countries can be compared.
Two sources were used to constitute our dataset: EUKLEMS8 and the STAN dataset from OECDSTAT9.
EUKLEMS is a database ﬁnanced by the European commission which provides time series on prices, volumes, and
current values for output value added, and 8 diﬀerent inputs including ICT capital. It also uses growth accounting
to compute total factor productivity. STAN, on the other hand, provides time series data typically starting around
1987 for variables such as R&D, trade and the number of ﬁrms, which we will use as controls. We also use
input-output matrices from both the OECD and EUKLEMS to construct one of our variables.
While the two classiﬁcations for Europe and US were consistent at our level of aggregation , the STAN database
sometimes uses the SIC rev2 classiﬁcation before 1995, while other data uses SIC rev 3. The latter contains more
details than the former. For instance, and unfortunately, the three sectors of sale, retail, and wholesale trade all
belong to the wider ensemble of WHOLESALE AND RETAIL TRADE in SIC rev2. In this case our only choice
was generally to use the wider ensemble, which explains the loss of 8 sectors (16 in total). All our regressions have
the log of producer price indice as their dependent variable.
7see appendix A for a list of the sectors
8see O'Mahony and Timmer, 2009, for a complete description
9the oecd.stat website provides detailed descriptions of each variable used
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4.2 Measuring the ICT-productivity eﬀect
4.2.1 ICT investment
We deﬁne ICT investment as the ratio of ICT capital on value added. A problem may be that, as the price of
ICT has been falling, a ﬁrm could actually use more ICT but have a decreasing level of spending. However such
a problem is likely to appear within a given sector, not across them. Indeed all sectors face comparable price
reductions in their ICT equipment : the composition of ICT invesment matters little. Thus this should not aﬀect
too much our preferred regression which uses random eﬀects. What is more, the evolution in ICT prices each year
should theorically be accounted for by our direct costs measures which will capture the evolution of input prices
between t and t-1. Appendix B also describes how volumes raised bigger concerns that current values.
One thing we expect of ICT as a special input is that its eﬀect should be felt with a long lag as reaping its full
beneﬁts takes time. Bresnahan (2002) for instance estimates such a lag to be 7 years. We settle for a slightly shorter
lag and use ICT over value added for the past 5 years, not including the current period t. Note that the use of lag
going as far as 5 years may come as a surprise when studying a form of capital that typically depreciates quickly.
We thus implicitly assume that any productivity-enhancing characteristic of an ICT product will stay available in
future versions of it. We also expect the impact of ICT to be smooth as learning and that using new techniques is a
gradual process. The need to smooth is felt from an empirical perspective too, as investment in ICT is quite volatile
in some sectors. We thus use moving averages; so our ﬁnal variable is the average of the ratio ICT investment to
value added for the last 5 years prior to t.
4.2.2 Indirect investment
To account for the productive eﬀect of ICT as fully as possible we deﬁne a measure of  indirect investment .
The idea is that as an industry becomes more productive through ICT, its services become cheaper, which should
translate into lower costs for the users of the service. Therefore an industry that purchases a lot from sectors that
invest a lot in ICT should have, ceteris paribus, a lower level of inﬂation. This idea has similarities with the work
of Paul-Antoine Beretti and Gilbert Cette in 2009 who wished to measure more precisely each industry's exposure
to ICT. However, the method used here diﬀers.
The constitution of this variable was a technical challenge, and is described in details in appendix B. The idea
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is to compute, for each industry, the amount of ICT investment embodied in its inputs using input-output matrices
in a Leontieﬀ fashion. To do so we take ICT investment for each industry j and multiply this investment by the
weight of industry j in industry i's total intermediary consumption. Note that we only go  one step  towards
capturing all embodied ICT; we could reproduce the method over and over to include the level of ICT investment
embodiement of industries further down the supply chain but this is unlikely to make a diﬀerence in our variable,
and most importantly the economic reasoning behind it would become far fetched.
Once we obtained this  indirect ICT capital  for each industry, we take its ratio to value added and 5 years
moving averages in the way as for direct investment.
4.2.3 Complementary investments
The idea of expressing ICT spending as a long lagged investment is again to account for the time needed for ﬁrms
to reap the full beneﬁts of their ICT investments. However, this time to adopt may not be equal across sectors, or
vary linearly with ICT spending. As highlighted by Sherer, it will depend on complementary investments.
To account for adoption eﬀect, we ﬁrst considered using Johnson's technology matrix which uses patents citations
from a sector A by sector B to proxy the technological proximity between the two10. We could thus have proxied
the adoption rate by the proximity of each sector to ICT producing sectors. However such a matrix was only
available for a given year; and we were concerned that patents in ICT production, particularly computers, may
reﬂect inovations in components rather than new functionalities usable by others. We have also considered using a
measure of unobservable investments following Sherer but this was hard to properly estimate within the time limit
allowed.
We thus settled for an interaction term between the ratio of ICT investment and value added and the proportion
of skilled workers hours worked in total hours. The idea is that skilled workers are the most complementary factor
to ICT capital, so we expect a quicker ICT adoption when their proportion is increasing. This interation only
reﬂects a correlation, since an increase in the number of skilled workers can be either a cause or a consequence of a
high rate of adoption.
10see Johnson, D. K. (2002)
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4.3 Measuring the ICT price eﬀect
The direct eﬀect of ICT as an input comes from its contribution to the reduction in the ﬁrm's total costs. To
measure it, we could include the prices of inputs directly in our regression. However like in growth accounting
this would lead to many problems (see again Barro, 1998). In particular assigning a constant coeﬃcient to factor
prices means assuming that the share of each factor in total cost is constant, which is to say we would be assume
that there is no substitution over time. In this context, it seems more sensible to include total costs rather that
individual factors in our regression, as they should be a linear function of prices. Then to identity each factor's
contribution we use the mathematical decomposition from our model:
4C
C
= (1− α)4w
w
+ α
4Pict
Pict
This can be estimated without econometrics using the average factor share in total costs between t-1 and t to
proxy α and (1− α), as in growth accounting. For instance if producer prices fall by 4% following a 10% decrease
in nominal costs, and the contribution of ICT to the fall in nominal cost is 50%, we conclude that the falling price
of ICT has had a depressing eﬀect of 2% on ﬁnal prices.
However this mathematical derivation was obtained by solving a simple cost minimization problem for a given
level of output and, since there were constant returns to scale, a given level of inputs. This is why, in the the
expression above, any movement in costs comes from factor prices. In practice, costs will also vary with the
volumes of factors, this eﬀect of volumes can be accounted by using the diﬀerenced form of a more general cost
function, wherein factors are allowed to vary. We also include all the inputs considered in the study.
4C
C
= sl(
4L
L
+
4w
w
) + sII(
4II
II
+
4PII
PII
) + sKict(
4Kict
Kict
+
4PKict
PKict
) + sKnonict(
4Knonict
Knonict
+
4PKnonict
PKnonict
) (9)
Where si is the share for each factor in total costs. This means that in our analysis we implicitly assume that
volume variation and price variation will have a similar eﬀect on prices. This assumption may lead to a downward
bias in our passthrough as the impact on unit costs of variations of in factor use could be lower. Indeed factor
use should increase production while price movements should not. However the impact of factor use on production
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will typically occur with a lag (notably for investment goods), so that it seems sensible to include volume variation
between t and t-1 to stufy inﬂationary pressures at t. What is more, we still consider this assumption to be much
more realistic than that of constant factor shares. Appendix C also discusses how this mathematical decomposition
carries a small measurement error.
We express total costs in the same format as our dependent variable: we express it as an indice and take its log.
This way we will be able to study how an increase of 1% in costs translates into price evolution.
4.4 Controls
There are two types of controls we are interested in:  markup and  productivity  controls. The goal of the
 markup  controls is to account for factors that directly inﬂuence price setting, in particular the strength of
competition, and that of demand. We proxy the former with data on the number and the size of ﬁrms from the
STAN database of the OECD. We use 2 variables: the total number of ﬁrms, and the proportion of ﬁrms with more
than 200 employees to account for the fact that large ﬁrms may have monopoly power.
We proxy demand by using the price-output and output-price elasticities, computed from our EUKLEMS
database, and trade data from STAN. Price elasticities are meant to evaluate the eﬀect on demand of a decrease in
price so as to have an indication of pricing power. Output price elasticity, on the other hand, should tell us whether
the evolution in prices is driven more by supply or demand : if a price increase follows a rise in production this is
likely to be a result of a demand shock, and conversely. An obvious problem with these two variables is that they
are subject to reverse causality. To account for this, we use the change in price at t-1 and the change in value added
at t for price elasticities, and the opposite for output elasticity. Finally, for our trade data, we use net trade as an
indication of excess demand or supply, and the log of imports to proxy the evolution of demand.
 Productivity  controls account for variables inﬂuencing prices through the evolution of productivity. This is
important in isolating the eﬀect of our variable measuring ICT driven technological change. Two obvious candidates
emerge: R&D and business cycles. The former can lead to cost-reducing process innovations, but also potentially
lead to price increasing product innovations, while the second arises from the well-know observation that productivity
rises when the economy is booming, possibly through increasing returns to scale.
Since R&D is comparable, in eﬀect, to ICT in our analysis, we measure it the same way by using 5 years moving
average. Business cycles are captured using the log of a 3-years moving average of indexed proﬁts. This 3-years
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period was chosen somewhat arbitrarily because it provides the right balance between the length of time needed to
capture a cycle and the willingness not to smooth the variable too much. Again, we take the ratio to value added
to ensure all these variables are comparable with one another.
Obviously, some of these controls will impact prices through both of these channels. A positive business cycle
captured through proﬁts can, for instance, reﬂect strong demand and thus actually increase prices through the
markup. Similarly, a large import penetration may reﬂect a large demand but also the fact that the domestic
market is open to competition, which could drive prices down. Therefore, we should not put too much emphasis on
actual coeﬃcients on these variables. Rather, we just hope that together they control for variation from productivity
and markup movements. We also add a dummy for country, 0 for the Netherlands and 1 for the US.
The downside of our controls is that they contain a large number of missing values. If we were to include all
of them in our preferred regression this would shift our number of observations from 1056 observations to 107.
Appendix D describe particular manipulations made to maximise our number of observations
5 ESTIMATION AND RESULTS
5.1 General approach
We decide to test equation (8) in two manners. The ﬁrst is to introduce our productivity variables, which are meant
to capture the productivity eﬀect β4Kict/Kict, directly in the price regression. This means running the following:
logPit = α log costit︸ ︷︷ ︸
(a)
+ β
Iicti,t−5;t−1
V Ai,t−5;t−1
+ γ
indirectIicti,t−5;t−1
V Ai,t−5;t−1
+ δ
complementIicti,t−5;t−1
V Ai,t−5;t−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
(b)
+ controlsit + εit (10)
We shall refer to the above as our  direct  estimation. To be sure of stripping the productivity eﬀect of ICT,
a second method would consist in instrumenting TFP with our productivity variables. This would allow us, in
theory, to remove any other elements than ICT that inﬂuence total factor productivity. In this case our ﬁrst stage
regression would thus be:
27
log TFPit = α log costit+β
Iicti,t−5;t−1
V Ai,t−5;t−1
+γ
indirectIicti,t−5;t−1
V Ai,t−5;t−1
+δ
complementIicti,t−5;t−1
V Ai,t−5;t−1
+controlsit+εit (11)
And our second stage:
logPit = α log costit + log T̂FPit + controlsit + εit (12)
As OLS estimators behave in a satisfactory way throughout our estimations, we decide to use either ﬁxed eﬀect
or random eﬀects. Since industries diﬀer largely one from the other, it seems intuitive to use ﬁxed eﬀects. However,
here we study relative evolutions in prices and costs, not levels, so capturing time invariant factors through ﬁxed
eﬀects does not seem justiﬁed, a priori. Nevertheless relative evolutions are not like ﬁrst diﬀerences; and initial
diﬀerences in the price levels may inﬂuence the way costs are passed onto prices. For instance, a ﬁrm charging
high prices through a large markup may be willing to pass on a lower share of an increase in costs to prices; while
a ﬁrm operating in perfect competition will not have a choice. Therefore time invariant factors may have a small
impact on relative evolutions. Nevertheless we do not expect such diﬀerences to be especially correlated with ICT
spending, so it may, a priori, bring noise into our estimations, but no bias. What is more, we hope our  markup 
controls on demand and the strength of competition will help to mitigate this eﬀect.
Where do we expect to ﬁnd a diﬀerential eﬀect of ICT spending? For our ICT-productivity eﬀect we expect
cross sectional variation to drive our results: an industry that has been spending more on ICT over the last 5
years should be more productive today and thus have relatively decreasing prices. Indeed within a given industry
it would be hard to capture a productivity eﬀect on prices since productivity typically  kicks in  gradually and
with uncertain lags. The study of the time patterns with which productivity aﬀects prices would thus surely require
advanced time series methods, and a very long sample. Therefore, from this perspective too, random eﬀects are
preferred, and will be used in this paper.
We provide 6 variants for each approach with diﬀerent combinations of controls. This reﬂects our willingness to
include controls and to provide a full picture of all industries and consistent periods. The sixth regression provides
a new Keynesian Phillips curve approach that is unrelated with the theory exposed. This regression is also, a priori,
unsuited to a panel data sectoral analysis. Indeed since the goal of this paper is to observe and quantify variables
28
that commonly aﬀect all sectors, including each sector's own lag and forwarded inﬂation is not very interesting.
This last regression should thus be seen foremost as a robustness check in which we study the impact of very strong
variables on our variables of interest.
5.2 Results
5.2.1 Direct estimation
The results for this approach are summarized in table 3:
Table 3: direct estimation results
We ﬁrst observe that the variables of interest usually have the expected sign. Unsurprisingly, our variable "total
cost" is our best predictor of the evolution of prices. It is between 0 and 1 as expected since ﬁrms should pass
29
Table 3:
only part of their increase in direct costs to prices; and its value remains solidly anchored around 0,45 in the ﬁrst
5 regressions. Note, however, the inclusion of lagged and future price evolution strongly aﬀects its coeﬃcient.
However, as mentioned, we do not see this speciﬁcation as economically instructive, so that we only observe here
that the log of costs remain signiﬁcant at the 0.1 level.
With respect to our ICT/productivity variables, our 5 years moving averages of ICT investment over value
added are positive and signiﬁcant in half of the speciﬁcations and borderline signiﬁcant in two others, including the
new Keynesian form, which we see as a good sign of robustness. The coeﬃcient should be read as semi elasticities:
for instance using speciﬁcation (5) an increase of 0.1 (say from 10% to 20%) in ICT's share in value added over the
last 5 years should lead to a decrease in inﬂation diﬀerential of 5.29%, which is broadly consistent with previous
ﬁndings on the eﬀect of productivity over costs (such as Prado, 2008). However these coeﬃcients also vary strongly
from -0.25 to -3.51, in the ﬁrst 5 speciﬁcations, so our eﬀect, although it seems existent, remains hard to evaluate.
The results for indirect investment are insigniﬁcant, and positive in our preferred regression (5). This ﬁnding
is a bit disappointing, but trying to capture an indirect productivity eﬀect on such a complex process as pricing
decision was quite ambitious. We considered the possibility that this variable is collinear with direct ICT investment,
however it does not appear to be. More interesting is our measure of complementary investment which is of the
expected sign with lower p-values as our sample size expands. However we note that the variable gains signiﬁcance
when R&D is left out, which tells us that the signiﬁcant of this interaction may come more from the share of skilled
workers' evolution , which may be related to R&D, than ICT.
Nevertheless considering these variables together we regard the performance of our productivity measure as
quite satisfying. To check this we add all of these 3 variables to constitute an index: it is negative and signiﬁcant
at the 0.1 signiﬁcance level in all regressions except the ﬁrst one.
Turning to our markup controls, we ﬁnd, as expected, that the log of import is our best performing variable,
with a positive sign and signiﬁcant in two out of the three regressions in which it features. Net trade is much less
robust however. Looking at the dummy for countries we ﬁnd it to be consistently and strongly insigniﬁcant in all
speciﬁcations. This ﬁnding is reassuring as it implies that the fact that we used two diﬀerent countries has not
impacted on our results.  Total  and  Smallness , which stand for total number of ﬁrms and the proportion
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of small ones, obtain poor results. For the former this could reﬂect the fact that although bigger ﬁrms may have
monopoly power, they could also exhibit increasing returns to scale, which would drive prices down. As these
variables are costly in terms of observations we drop them in all remaining speciﬁcations. The picture is mixed for
our two elasticities: price elasticity of production has the expected sign and is usually signiﬁcant, but the converse
is true for the output elasticity of price.
Finally we discuss our productivity controls. We ﬁnd as expected that proﬁts of the last three years have a
negative impact in all but 1 speciﬁcation, albeit not signiﬁcant. As mentioned, proﬁts are potentially subject to an
omitted variable problem since they could be driven by demand and thus have a positive eﬀect on price. So, the
fact that it is negative may mean we have captured well productivity eﬀects. Interestingly we ﬁnd that proﬁts are
indeed closer to signiﬁcance when the log of imports, our best proxy for demand, is included. With respect to R&D
we see that although it is positive in (1), which is not to be trusted, it becomes negative then signiﬁcant as the
sample size increases. R&D is nevertheless problematic as its inclusion biases our sample towards manufacturing
goods, as there is very little data on R&D for services. We have thus decided to include non ICT investment which
can be found in EUKLEMS when R&D is left out. Its results are mixed, notably in our preferred regression (5), in
which it is positive and signiﬁcant. However since R&D has in theory two opposing eﬀects on inﬂation depending
on whether it is dedicated to process or product innovation, the fact that we do not obtain clear-cut results for
non-ICT investment may not mean it is a bad proxy.
All the above regressions are corrected for heteroskedasticity, as initially our Breush and Pagan tests rejected
the null of no heteroskedasticity for all the speciﬁcations involved. We also ran these regressions controlling for
autocorrelation in the error term and actually obtained marginally better results. The interested reader may ﬁnd
these results in appendix E.
5.2.2 Instrumental variable estimation
Table 4 summarizes the results.
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Table 4: instrumental variable approach
These results are very similar to those obtained previously, and the same comments apply. Thus one would
be tempted to conclude that this table provides additional support to our story. However the ﬁrst stage of our
instrumental variable estimation provides very puzzling results. Table 5 gives the results this ﬁrst stage for (5), but
the patterns observed remain across speciﬁcations:
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Table 4:
Table 5: ﬁrst stage results for regression (5)
This implies that ICT variables are, at best, poor instruments; and at worst signiﬁcantly negatively correlated
to TFP. What is more, non ICT investment does seem to have the expected positive sign, which implies that ICT
investment is both individually and relatively harmful to total factor productivity.
5.2.3 An apparent puzzle
The previous section's results leave us with this puzzle: although ICT spending and TFP have comparable eﬀects
on prices setting, both are negatively correlated one with another. There are two possibilities to explain such a
pattern: either our direct regression captures an eﬀect of ICT on inﬂation that does not go through productivity,
or instrumenting TFP is not the appropriate way to capture the productivity eﬀect of ICT.
These two competing explanations are related to an old debate of growth accounting on how much TFP can be
trusted, and what it exactly captures. Solow initially viewed as it a measure of technological change, but very soon
authors such as Griliches and Jorgenson questioned its relevance by discussing its several sources of biasness (1967).
One particular source of concern is summarized by Prado (2008) in these terms:  To view TFP as an expression
of technical change suﬀers [. . . ] from the fact that the capital stock is an intrinsic carrier of new technology. New
technology is embodied in the capital stock. Without technical change, capital accumulation would just amount
to piling capital goods of already existing technology, and diminishing returns would thwart further eﬀorts to raise
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output. . Before carrying on we should also note that this problem is not necessarily incoherent with the discussion
of section 1 on ICT and productivity, since these studies usually consider the eﬀect of ICT on labour productivity,
not TFP.
The issue of whether capital inputs account for technical change in growth accounting can be expressed mathe-
matically from our model of section 2. Going back to Romer's production function (1), if growth accounting only
captures the private returns of ICT, that is, its eﬀect as a  regular input , then TFP evolution should be equal
to A'in equation (5), that is:
4A′
A′
=
4Y
Y
− α4K
K
− (1− α)4L
L
= β
4K
K
+
4A
A
(13)
On the other hand, if growth accounting does account for social returns, which is to say the eﬀect of ICT both
as a regular and a special input, then the actual obtained TFP would be only A not A', so that:
4A
A
=
4Y
Y
− α4K
K
− (1− α)4L
L
− β4K
K
(14)
The key diﬀerence is that in (13) TFP and K (ICT as a special input in our analysis) are positively correlated,
but in (14) they are negatively correlated. In other words TFP is deﬁned by (14) then the negative relationship
observed between our measure of TFP and lagged ICT investments is not puzzling. This would just imply that this
IV estimation was not appropriate.
On the other hand if TFP is in fact deﬁned by (13) then the results the ﬁrst stage of our IV estimation are
a real puzzle. We should therefore conclude that the productivity eﬀect is non-existent, since there appears to be
no link between ICT and TFP. With respect to our direct estimation this would mean that our 5 years moving
averages indicators of ICT investments probably only represent the capital deepening eﬀect of ICT on inﬂation.
The negative coeﬃcients on inﬂation would thus reﬂect either a spurious relationship, or the fact that ICT services
became cheaper over time.
In this context, the question of the measurement of capital stock becomes crucial. EUKLEMS uses a perpetual
inventory method with geometric depreciation and expost rates of returns11. Biatour et al. (2007) ﬁnd that this
method of estimating capital volumes, usually gives higher contribution of TFP to growth than others. Although
11see Timmer and O`mahony (2009) for more details
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the diﬀerence is very marginal, from this perspective EUKLEMS should give us a slightly higher correlation between
lagged ICT investment and TFP. Another element in EUKLEMS may play against us however: the use of US hedonic
prices. Indeed, EUKLEMS uses the US quality adjusted deﬂators for the US, and applies Schreyer's harmonisation
procedure (2002), which is also based on the American deﬂators, to other countries. Since the US correction is
the strongest of all national bureaus this could mean that the ICT capital stock growth is relatively higher in
EUKLEMS, and thus an undershooting of TFP. Overall it is hard to judge whether the problem is more acute in
our dataset.
5.3 Who to trust? An investigation based on 3 robustness checks
While we do not expect to disentangle capital accumulation and TFP, thus settling a 55 year old debate, in this
dissertation12, we may provide a few elements to help us discuss which of our two estimation strategies is the most
appropriate. From the discussion above we can expect three patterns:
1) If our lagged ICT measure captures simply a capital accumulation eﬀect in the direct estimation, the inclusion
of lagged cost evolution should take on some of the variation previously explained by our productivity measure, as
it should account for part of the price eﬀect at t-2.
2) In the same vein, a productivity eﬀect should be felt with a longer lag than pure accumulation eﬀects.
Therefore if we change our measure of ICT to put more weight on the more distant lags of our 5 years ICT
investments measures, we should isolate the productivity eﬀect. Thus if the variable remains signiﬁcant, it would
imply that our ICT variables in our direct estimation do not measure only accumulation.
3) Finally if TFP is biased by the inclusion of ICT in growth accounting, using only capital without diﬀerencing
between ICT and non ICT should increase the correlation between TFP and ICT capital. Indeed including solely
capital is a way to isolate pure accumulation eﬀects by considering any unit of capital should have the same impact
on production. If this modiﬁcation in the way TFP is measured does not aﬀect the negative relationship between
ICT and TFP found in our IV regression, it would imply this a relationship was more than a statistical phenomenon.
Implementing this in our regression should provide us with robustness checks to judge each possible estimation
strategy. 1) and 2) are tests of whether our direct estimation ICT measure capture productivity, while 3) is more a
test of whether TFP already accounts for the productivity eﬀect of ICT. All the results for these three checks can
12Abramovitz ﬁrst described TFP as  a measure of our ignorance  in 1956
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be found in appendix F, G, and H, for 1) 2) and 3) respectively.
In testing 1) we simply add the lag of the log of total costs in our direct regression. This inclusion does not
aﬀect our results: if anything, our productivity measures gain in strength and signiﬁcance. ICT/VA is signiﬁcant
in all but one regression, and the two others are usually negative and in some cases signiﬁcant.
To test 2) we need to attribute weights to each lag of ICT/VA, which is to say, to specify a form for the learning
curve of ICT capital. We pick a traditional form in which costs reduction is an increasing and concave function
of time. y = x0.5. Each lag is thus multiplied by the squared root of its distance to t in years. We apply the
same transformation to our indirect investment measure. Again the results are marginally better, the p-values of
ICT/VA decrease further: the variable is now signiﬁcant at the 0.01 signiﬁcance level in 4 out of 6 forms, the two
others productivity measures obtain, as usual, less clear-cut results.
Finally testing 3) required that we compute our own TFP. We include 3 factors: Labour, intermediary con-
sumption, and capital. This is a rough measure compared to EUKLEMS' TFP series which include 8 factors; but
the goal here is simply to run a robustness check. In the case of capital, the grouping of two types of investment
is, as mentioned, deliberate. Appendix E shows the result of the ﬁrst stage regression of our IV estimation for our
preferred speciﬁcation (5). It appears that our productivity measures switch signs and now covaries positively with
TFP, and signiﬁcantly so, for our complementary investments measure. Non ICT investment, on the other hand,
loses signiﬁcance.
Therefore all of our three checks seem to point to our direct estimation as the most suited one to capture a
productivity eﬀect. 1) and 2) show that the results of section 4.2.1 were not, a priori, driven by the fact that
ICT/VA captured a short run eﬀect of factor price decrease on costs, while 3) tells us that the relationship between
ICT and TFP is indeed aﬀected by the fact ICT accumulation is used to compute TFP.
In conclusion, although our instrumental variable approach casts doubt over the causality of the correlation
between ICT and prices, the relevance of our ﬁrst estimation strategy seems greater. Therefore we continue to
view our results as suggestive, albeit not conclusive, that ICT has indeed diminished real costs and thus prices by
increasing productivity.
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6 LIMITS, FURTHER ANALYSIS, AND POSSIBLE EXTENSIONS
This section is split into 3 quite distinct subsections; we ﬁrst go deeper into the analysis of our productivity eﬀect.
We then provide a more in depth analysis of our price eﬀect, trying to estimate how falling ICT prices have aﬀected
costs using Leontieﬀ economics. Finally we attempt to discuss possible limitations and strengths of our estimation.
6.1 Productivity eﬀect: who and when?
6.1.1 Who?
We distinguish between users and producers in order to have an indication of how much our results are explained
by the ICT producing sectors. Indeed as these sectors exhibit high ICT spending and rapidly decreasing prices
they probably contributed to our results. Table 6 shows the results of a similar regression that that of section 4.2,
but excluding  ELECTRICAL AND OPTICAL EQUIPMENT  and  POST AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS .
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Table 6:
Table 6:direct estimation excluding ICT producing industries
The coeﬃcient on our most eﬃcient variable  ICT  from section 4 are only negative in 4 out of 6 speciﬁcations.
However the p-values are much lower when the coeﬃcient is negative, and the variable is actually signiﬁcant at the
0.05 level for three of our speciﬁcations, including our preferred one (5), and (6). Indirect investment also conﬁrms
that it may have a counterintuitive coeﬃcient as it is positive and signiﬁcant in (5) and (6). However the eﬀect
itself is much more modest than that of ICT.
Overall this table suggests that ICT producing industries have partly, but not fully, driven our results.
6.1.2 When?
We now look at the time patterns of our results to see when the deﬂationary pressures from ICT were felt the most.
This table could also be seen as a robustness check since, as mentioned in section 1.1, the productivity gains in the
US and the Netherlands were only felt in the data from 1995 on; and especially between 1995 and 2001. We thus
expect our results to be more signiﬁcant in this period. Table 7 hows the results from our preferred regression (5)
for 4 5-years period between 85 and 2005:
The coeﬃcient on our  ICT  variable is indeed higher between 1995 and 2000. Its value -0.72 implies that
an increase of 0.1 in the ratio of ICT over VA would lead to a decrease of 7.2% in prices. The next period also
performs well with a slightly lower coeﬃcient but also signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level. The two previous periods show
no signiﬁcance, although the sign is as expected. This is in accordance with previous work. The coeﬃcient on
indirect ICT spending is signiﬁcant and negative in the last regression. It would be tempting to see this evolution
as a sign that the productivity eﬀect starts spreading onto the economy, but considering the performance of our
indirect investment variable, this would be quite a long shot.
38
Table 7: results for speciﬁcation (5) per 5-years period
6.2 Estimating the price eﬀect
Applying the method described in section 3.3, we now separate the cost variation into the volume and price
contributions of each of our 4 factors. In face of the extension we will later include, it is preferable to focus on
only one country. We pick the US because its data seems marginally better. However for the Netherlands the
contributions have a similar pattern as those for the US as summarized in the ﬁgure 6, in which the total cost
variation is normalized to 100%, and contributions averaged over 5 years periods across industries:
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Figure 6: Contributions to total costs evolution, in %
The contribution of ICT is bounded by its fairly modest share in total cost. Nevertheless ICT has played a part:
the large volume increase contributed positively to costs, and the falling prices contributed negatively.
In values the price contribution in % points compared to the evolution of total costs for the whole economy is:
To translate this contribution into a price eﬀect we need to multiply it by the pass-through from costs to price,
which is evaluated by the coeﬃcient of costs in our regressions. We use the value of our preferred regression (5)
from our direct estimation: 0.424662777. We should note that using the estimated pass-through brings with it its
share of potential biases and measurement error; so the following ﬁgures should be considered with care:
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These ﬁgures should be seen as an indication of deﬂationary pressure from ICT prices, as they are equal to the
diﬀerence between what costs are and what they would have been if ICT prices stayed constant. We see here that
this eﬀect is non negligible, especially during the 1995 to 2000 period where inﬂation was 0.13% lower thanks to
ICT.
However to take into account the full eﬀect of ICT in each industry i we should not only consider the direct
eﬀect from ICT spending, but also that on other industries' prices, which feed back into i's costs through inter-
mediary consumption. To express this mathematically we use the decomposition of equation (9), we also continue
deﬁning the downward pressures on costs as the diﬀerence between what costs are and what they would be with-
out the decrease in ICT prices; so that any other term than PKict and PII vanishes. We obtain the total pressure
on costs for a given industry Di, as a function of ICT price variation
4PKict
PKict
weighted by its share in total cost sKicti .
Di = sKicti
4PKict
PKict
+ 0.425sII
(
τi1 ... τin
)(
Di .. Dn
)ᵀ
Where τij represents the share of industry j in i's intermediate consumption. Deﬁning the contribution of ICT
to the decrease in cost as di = sKictn
4PKict
PKict
, and extending to all industries, we get:
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(16)
We multiply this by our passtrough 0.424662777 to obtain deﬂationary pressures for each industry, which are
summarized in table 8:
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Table 8: total deﬂationary pressures from falling ICT prices per industry
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A similar table can be found for the Netherlands in appendix I. As expected taking into account the impact
of ICT on intermediary consumption magniﬁes the direct impact of ICT on inﬂation. Between 1995 and 2001 this
diﬀerence is a non trivial 0.04. The sectors that beneﬁted the most were  post and telecommunication  and
 ﬁnancial intermediation , whose prices decreased by respectively 0.55 and 0.61 percentage points.
Overall one could conclude from this table that ICT as an input surely has helped keeping inﬂation down as
early as 1985, and especially after 1995. Nevertheless this eﬀect, although non trivial, is to us unlikely to be the
full story of ICT and inﬂation.
6.3 Limits and possible ways forward
Due to the broadness of the subject considered and the time constraint faced, our study contains a certain amount
of ﬂaws. We provide in this section a summary of these, some of which have already been mentioned as we were
progressing,
We consider the main ﬂaw of the paper to be that it may account insuﬃciently for industry diﬀerences. We have
already discussed the issue of diﬀerences in markups which may aﬀect the price levels and thus their growth of prices.
Taxes are likely to have a similar eﬀect. The fact that our dummy for country does not seem relevant is reassuring
in this context, as we expect diﬀerences in taxation to be more country-speciﬁc than industry-speciﬁc. Nevertheless
industry diﬀerences in taxation, and more generally sector speciﬁc policies such as subsidies in agriculture, may
have polluted our results.
A bigger issue lies in the evolution of markups overtime, particularly stemming from diﬀerences in the evolution
of demand between sectors. Our controls were meant to account for such an evolution and avoid an omitted variable
bias, and some actually performed well such as the evolution of imports; however their inclusion was sometimes
complicated by their costs in terms of observations. We have considered using a simultaneous equation method to
proxy demand then plug it into our regression, but this was hard to implement within the time constraint.
There are nevertheless a few elements that lead us to believe that the problems met in capturing demand do
not threaten our ﬁndings this much. One element comes from our relatively high level of aggregation. Indeed while
diﬀerence in demand evolution may be very large for some particular products, these diﬀerences should be smoothed
when we group them with other products. Another element comes from our ﬁndings themselves. The results of
speciﬁcation (2), which includes the log of imports, and (5), our preferred form, are not so diﬀerent qualitatively
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and in terms of signiﬁcance. Finally and most importantly, anecdotic evidence tells us that the industries that have
experienced a rise in demand since 1980 tend to be the very ones which invested heavily in ICT (market services,
actual IT production), with the notable exception of oil production. Therefore we believe that if there is an omitted
variable bias that is likely to go against us.
One obvious issue when dealing with sectors is the level of aggregation. In our study the number of sectors is quite
low, which was necessary considering the data we had. We have mentioned the positive eﬀect of aggregation with
respect to capturing industry diﬀerences. However the same smoothing property of aggregation plays against us for
our ICT measures. For instance having to group retail trade with other less ICT intensive subcategories prevented
the explicit inclusion of a sector that has invested heavily in ICT and experienced large gains in productivity. By
grouping it we have diluted its eﬀect and lowered the sample variation in explanatory variables. Thus although
the eﬀect on coeﬃcients is uncertain, the impact of aggregation on the robustness of our results has in theory been
negative.
We see two possible extensions to this work. One, which was initially what motivated this work, would be to
relate productivity growth from ICT to trade patterns. Did industries which have experienced the most productivity
gains export more? The answer to this question would require more countries in our analysis. One would also
probably need to run panels on diﬀerent countries for a given industry to have a clearer idea of who should be more
competitive in a given market. Finally this would also require more complete data on trade, and particularly on
services.
The second extension would be to run a similar regression on proﬁts. Indeed in our model we have assumed
that the rate of markup was zero, so that any productivity gain had to translate to prices. In theory, ﬁrms could
also increase their markup leaving prices constant and pushing up proﬁts. Our evidence seems to point out that the
more you invest in ICT, the lower is your price. This would imply that the cost saving eﬀect has been larger than
the evolution of the markup, but not than the markup has not gone up. Studying proﬁts would thus be interesting
from a purely macroeconomic perspective as it would relate to the issue of the sharing of productivity gains; and in
our context as it would help to assess the strength of the pro competitive eﬀect of ICT mentioned in section 3.1.3. If
the biggest ICT spenders have had larger proﬁts than other industries, this would imply that this pro-competition
eﬀect has been limited, or at least equal amongst industries regardless of ICT spending. Appendix J provides a
ﬁrst step towards such an estimation, and discusses its shortcomings.
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7 Conclusion
As this paper is a ﬁrst attempt at capturing the disinﬂationary eﬀect of ICT, we believe that the results obtained
should foster future research. Long lagged ICT investment has the expected negative and signiﬁcant impact on
price evolution. The study is also relevant to the debate on the interpretation of TFP. Indeed the fact that ICT in
itself has a negative function of prices but is negatively correlated to TFP, a priori, brings support to the argument
that TFP is a biased estimation of technology advances. Our robustness tests also point in this direction.
One undisputable disinﬂationary pressure of ICT is its falling prices. Our estimation of such pressures gives
an impact as high as -0.18 on average between 95 and 2000 for the US, using a fairly conservative measure of the
pass-through from costs to prices. If we add our productivity eﬀect, we estimate that the average deﬂationary
pressure from ICT over this period has been of 0.24 points for a given growth rate. Although such an estimate
should of course not be taken literally, as the variance of the coeﬃcient on our productivity measure remains quite
high, this does suggest that ICT has really been a great contributor to this period's pattern of high growth and low
inﬂation.
In turn this implies that Greenspan's much criticized stance on monetary policy during this period may actually
have been appropriate, or at least that the intuition behind it was correct. The paper also has ﬁscal policy
implications, notably for European countries which have yet to feel the productivity gains from ICT. Investing
more in ICT or fostering its adoption, for instance by increasing the number of IT graduates, could help them to
experience a similar high growth and low inﬂation episode.
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Appendix A
Sectors in EUKLEMS and sector used
**BASIC METALS AND FABRICATED METAL **POST AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS
CHEMICAL. RUBBER. PLASTICS AND FUEL PRIVATE HOUSEHOLDS ...
**Chemicals and chemical PUBLIC ADMIN... DEFENCE... SOCIAL SECURITY
**Coke. reﬁned petroleum and nuclear fuel **PULP. PAPER... PRINTING AND PUBLISHING
**COMMUNITY SOCIAL AND PERSONAL SERVICES Real estate activities
**CONSTRUCTION **REAL ESTATE... BUSINESS ACTIVITIES
EDUCATION Renting of m&eq and other business activities
**ELECTRICAL AND OPTICAL EQUIPMENT Retail trade. except of motor vehicles. . .
**ELECTRICITY. GAS AND WATER SUPPLY **Rubber and plastics
EXTRA-TERRITORIAL ORGANIZATIONS ... Sale. maintenance and repair of motor vehicles . . .
FINANCE. INSURANCE... BUSINESS SERVICES **TEXTILES... LEATHER AND FOOTWEAR
**FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION TOTAL INDUSTRIES
**FOOD . BEVERAGES AND TOBACCO TOTAL MANUFACTURING
HEALTH AND SOCIAL WORK **TRANSPORT AND STORAGE
**HOTELS AND RESTAURANTS TRANSPORT STORAGE COMMUNICATION
**MACHINERY. NEC TRANSPORT EQUIPMENT
**MANUFACTURING NEC; RECYCLING **WHOLESALE AND RETAIL TRADE
**MINING AND QUARRYING Wholesale trade and commission trade..
**OTHER COMMUNITY. SOCIAL..SERVICES **WOOD AND OF WOOD AND CORK
**AGRICULTURE. ... OTHER NON-METALLIC MINERAL
Table 9: EUKLEMS sectors, stars indicate those used in the study
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Appendix B
Technical diﬃculties with productivity variables
ICT/VA: the choice of current values over volumes
EUKLEMS provides two types of variables: in volumes expressed as an indice with a base of 100 in 1995, and in
current value as a share of total investment of per hour worked. One problem is that volumes, even normalized, are
likely to reﬂect industrial diﬀerences in global investment, which are themselves driven by other factors. Our controls,
particularly the evolution of non-ICT investment could partially adress this issue, but taking ICT investment as a
share of an industry's value added (or total costs) does seem a more viable option. However using volume ratios
can give us misleading values of the investment capacities of a sector by not accounting for the change in prices for
each industry: for instance in the US the Coke and petroleum industry had an indice for value added in volume
of 125.13141 and an actual value added of 19826.27 in 1987, while this values were respectively of 123.35625 and
75702.38 in 2006. This is why to express ICT investment as a share of investment capacity we have used current
values.
INDIRECT INVESTMENT: classiﬁcation-related problems and how they were tackled
Two separate sources were used for input-output matrices: WIOD database and STAN. The former provides annual
data on 40 countries from 1995 to 2006 using NACE sectoral classiﬁcation. Its list of 35 industries is a bit more
detailed than EUKLEMS, with additional breakdown of the Transport sector and Textile and textiles products
industries, but both are perfectly consistent. The latter covers the period 1980-1995 but the tables are only
available every 5 years,. To estimate matrices for every year we thus use linear extrapolation for each sector j and
product i. We note Ct the vector of ICT's share in total capital compensation. Since EUKLEMS provides this
information for 30 sectors its format is (30 ;1)
As mentioned previously the use of STAN forces us to reagregate our data into 24 sectors by sometimes reporting
variables in the more aggregated SIC rev2 format. Here, this means that in both of our sources, we sum each
subsector's intermediary consumption and regroup them into their wider ensemble. Therefore our input-output
matrices count for 24 columns. The link between both versions of SIC was done via rev3. In some cases the
compatibility was blurred especially in some  catch-all  sectors such as  Professional goods  or  Other
53
Figure 7: Comparison of technical coeﬃcients Electrical and Optical Equipment and Manufacturing, Nec 1995
manufacturing . These were hard to correspond to their post 1995 counterparts, mainly  Electrical and Optical
Equipment  and Manufacturing, Nec; Recycling . However the structures of inputs for these two sectors are
very comparable, as highlighted in ﬁgure 7, Therefore any measurement error from imperfect matching is likely to
have a negligible eﬀect on our overall indicator.
The second step to obtain indirect investment is to multiply our vector of ICT spending by the input-output ma-
trices. To do so, the matrix must have 30 rows. For WIOD matrices, this simply implies grouping the subcategories
on transport and textile to ﬁt the more aggregated sector in EUKLEMS. For STAN matrices, however, we must
separate intermediary consumption into the more disaggregated EUKLEMS sectors. This was done by reproducing
for each sector j its structure of intermediary consumption at its closest observed value, where t=1995. For instance
in the  retail and wholesale trade  sector, which has quite distinct ICT spending proﬁles and weights in each
industry's intermediary consumption, for example, the  Paper and prining  sector's inputs includes 20% on sale,
20% on retail trade, and 60% on wholesale in 1995; and that each of these subcategories spend respectively 100,
100, and 200 on ICT capital in 1990. If paper and printing's total purchases towards  retail and wholesale trade 
are of 1000 in 90 then we estimate the detailed intermediary consumption to 200, 200, and 600 for each subsector
respectively, and its embodied ICT capital to 150.
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COMPLEMENTARY INVESTMENT: a small discrepancy
The detail on labour composition is available on EUKLEMS in the SIC rev3 classiﬁcation. Somehow there are
diﬀerences between data using SIC and data using NAICS in EUKLEMS. However these are minor , and the fact
that we use ratios should reduce such incompatibilities even further.
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Appendix C
The mathematical decomposition from section 4.3 implicitly assumes that α and 1-α are know exactly at every time
t. In our case we only have these value every year, so we cannot know the structure of inputs for a given month. In
other words we ignore the substitution that occurs within each year. This occurs accross our inputs, but also within
them, for instance for any substitution of an intermediairy good for another. We can only partly account for this
by taking the average of factors income share between t-1 and t, so as to get the average share of each factor during
the year t-1. Overall though we believe this measurement error should be small. Figure 8 conﬁrms this impression
by plotting actual total cost and our mathematically expressed one for randomly selected industries.
We express total costs in the same format as our dependent variable: we express it as an indice and take its log.
This way we will be able to study how an increase in 1% in costs translate into prices evolution.
Figure 8: discrepancy between estimated cost and actual cost
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Appendix D
Manipulations to controls
Controls from EUKLEMS did not cause any problems. For  STAN controls , let us ﬁrst note that trade data is
provided by the OECD in dollars, so that data for both countries are comparable. The problem of compatibility for
these variables was also not as pronounced here when we constituted our indirect ICT measure. Indeed, while values
were sometimes available only at larger level of aggregation, they were still ranked using the SIC rev3 classiﬁcation.
When data was only available for wider sectors, it was those sectors which had already been aggregated previously
when we were constituting our indirect investment variable, which is logical since the input-output matrices were
also taken from the OECD.
However, there were two cases in which the information for a sector was incomplete. The  TRANSPORT AND
STORAGE AND COMMUNICATION  sector, which gathers all subsectors with ISIC codes starting by 60 to
64, was the most problematic. This sector is split into  transport and storage  (60t63) and  post and telecom-
munication  (64) in EUKLEMS. The OECD only provides data for the sub-subcategory  telecommunication 
(6420) ; there is a part of but not all of  post and telecommunication , which is not reported. This subcate-
gory, nonetheless, represents on average 80% of the overall spending of  TRANSPORT AND STORAGE AND
COMMUNICATION  in the U.S, and thus at least 80% of  post and telecommunication . The problem is then
to estimate what part of the remaining 20% in R&D spending also comes from  post and telecommunication 
(64), and what part comes from  transport and storage  (60t63). We decide to allocate it according to their
respective level of output, in order not to waste the valuable information from  telecommunication , and keep our
sample to 24 (48) sectors. In the second case, the subcategories reported represented 99% of the variation of their
wider ensemble so we decided to simply disregard the diﬀerence by setting the sector's R&D expenditure equal to
the sum of its components.
A second manipulation was applied to our trade data. Here we have missing values for all years in the the sectors
 retail trade  and  hotels and restaurants, as well as some subsectors whose wider sector we are interested
in. However this missing data is not innocuous : either their activity entails being near their clients or, in the
case of R&D, is usually internal to a given ﬁrm (we have data on licensing). In other words, these sectors are
 non-tradables . We therefore change the missing values for these sectors to 0.
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Appendix E
Autocorrelation-corrected results for direct estimation
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Appendix F
Regression introducing the lag of costs
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Appendix G
Regression with more weight on  older  investment
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Appendix H
First stage of speciﬁcation (5) in IV regression
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Appendix I
ICT and proﬁt
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